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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

AMERICAN WAR.—We have now the *Gazette* account of the battle of *Chipawa*, and also the American account of that memorable and important contest.—I guessed our force at about three or four thousand men; and it appears now, that it did not amount to three thousand, out of which we lost in killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners, 878! The Americans say, that their force was *inferior* to ours. They state that they have *eighteen* of our officers prisoners; and their account agrees with ours as to the numbers that they took in the battle. Our *Gazette* says, that we took “*several hundreds of prisoners.*” But, why have we no detail? why no detailed list of what we have captured? Surely, several hundreds are soon counted. A thousand sheep, spread over a field, are counted in ten minutes. These omissions look suspicious.—It is certain, however, that the Americans did *retreat* with the prisoners they had made, and that they had to contend with a most gallant enemy.—Numerous as were the battles of Napoleon, and brave as were his soldiers, I do not believe that even he, the greatest warrior that ever lived, can produce, from his wars, an instance of a contest so well maintained, or, in proportion to the numbers engaged, so *bloody* as this of *Chipawa*.—Our own account tells us, that our *first* in command was *severely wounded*, our *second* in command *severely wounded and taken prisoner*; and, when we come to see the American account, we find, that their *first* and *second* in command were both so *severely wounded*, that neither was able to write, or to dictate, a dispatch to the Government several days after the battle. Yet we find, that this little band of *raw* troops (as the Americans must be), though *completely* left without heads to direct them, took off the cannon and the prisoners that they had captured during the engagement.—It appears from General Drummond's account, that the cannon of the two armies were run up to each others muzzles; that the fight was so close, and the confusion so

great, that the Americans, in one instance, put their horses into the limbers (or shafts) of our cannon, instead of the shafts of their own; and that the Americans *cut down our artillerymen from the very sides of our guns.*—The *Morning Chronicle* expresses its great *satisfaction*, that the expedition has, at last, sailed from Portsmouth to America. A few more battles, like that of *Chipawa*, would cause this organ of the Whigs to change its tone.—As I said before, it does appear, that the Americans, after the battle, *retired some miles*; and so does an army very often, when it has been successful. How many *victories*, good God! did we win in Portugal and Spain, without stopping an hour on the field of battle, but retreating from it with all possible speed? Did we not win a most *glorious victory* at Corunna; and did we not instantly embark, in the utmost confusion, leaving the town to the *beaten enemy*? Did we not win a still more glorious victory at Talavera, which earned the winner a *title*; and yet, did we not leave even our *own* wounded to the humanity of Napoleon's gallant army?—Now, the Americans, though they retired, they retired with our second in command, and a great many other prisoners. Why, therefore, may they not, in fact, have been the victors, if we were the victors at Corunna and Talavera?—But, it is of little consequence who really gained the victory. The important fact is, that we have now got an enemy, who fights as bravely as ourselves.—For some time the Americans cut no figure on land. They now have proved to us, that they only wanted *time* to acquire a little discipline. They have now proved to us what they are made of; that they are the same sort of men as those who captured whole armies under Burgoyne and Cornwallis; that they are neither to be frightened nor seduced; and that, if we should beat them at last, we cannot expect to do it without expending three or four hundred millions of money, keeping up all our present taxes, and adding to their amount, or imposing new taxes.—These are the facts, that

are now *proved* to us; these are the natural consequences of battles, such as that of Chipawa.—It has been stated in the newspapers, that *Admiral Cochrane* has taken **BALTIMORE**, the capital of Maryland; that *Stonington* has been demolished; that we are about to attack *New London*; and, therefore, says the writer, Jonathan must *look sharp about him*.—Baltimore is hardly taken, and will, I dare say, never be taken, without a most bloody contest. But, supposing it to be so; for our ships of great size can go quite up to the city, unless prevented by batteries on shore. Suppose the fact to be true, how are we to maintain that position? And, if we could maintain it for a year, how much nearer are we to our object? Baltimore is exposed to our attacks from its vicinity to the sea, and from the immense river that opens the way to us to reach it. But what is that place, or even all the State of Maryland, when we are talking of this great Republic, inhabited by *free men, resolved to defend their country*?—From the first, it was allowed by me, that we should do immense *mischief*; that we might burn many villages, towns, and cities, destroy mills and manufactories, and lay waste lands upon the coast, to the great loss and distress of numerous individuals. But, at the same time, I anticipated, that these acts would only tend to unite the Americans, and, in the end, produce such a hatred against us, as would not only render final success impossible, but, as would tend to shut us out from all future connection and intercourse with that great and fertile region.—There seemed to be wanting just such a war as this to complete the separation of England from America; and to make the latter feel, that she had no safety against the former, but in the arms of her free citizens.—We were told, as the reader will recollect, that the *Eastern States* would, in case of war, separate themselves from the rest of the Union, and join themselves to us. But, it now appears that our first grand stroke of destruction has been given in these our favourite States. *Stonington*, we are told, is demolished; and *New London* is, we are told, about to share the same fate. These places lie in our favourite State of Connecticut, in the midst of the Eastern States, who were to join us against their own Republican Government! This fact is, of itself, quite sufficient to upset all the stories about the Eastern States.—These

States now see what they have to expect at our hands; and, indeed, they did not want to see their towns destroyed, in order to be convinced that their safety lay in their firm obedience to the Union, and in the resolution to stand by their own Government.—It is, I suppose, intended to *batter* them into a separation; but, who is fool enough to believe, that such a mode will succeed with such a people? The demolition of *Stonington* will, in all probability, render the name of England so hateful in our favourite States, that no man will dare to raise his breath in defence of her conduct.—If we had confined our land war to Canada, it is possible, that Mr. Madison might have found it very difficult to make the people see how they were interested in the contest; but, the moment we shewed our design of carrying fire and sword along the whole coast of the United States, that moment we bound the whole of the people up like the bundle of sticks, described in the fable; especially as the manifestation of this design was accompanied, on the part of almost the whole of our public prints, with the open declaration, that it was necessary, now that we had the opportunity to subjugate America, to counter-revolutionize her, to destroy her Government, to reduce her to her former state of dependence on us. It is of great importance, that we bear in mind, not only these declarations, but also the *time*, when they began to be made.—While the duration of the power of Napoleon was not doubted; as long as there appeared to be no prospect of seeing him put down, a sort of ambiguous language was held as to the object of the war with America. Mr. Madison was accused with being a friend to Napoleon; he and his countrymen were abused; but nothing was distinctly said as to the *object of the war*. As the affairs of Napoleon grew gloomy, our prints, from time to time, grew high in their language as to the object of the American contest; and, when Napoleon was actually put down, they threw off all reserve, and, in the most distinct terms, with an air of official authority, they informed us, that we were not to lay down our arms, 'till we had effected, in America, what had been effected in France. The Government, we were told, was to be done away. Mr. Madison was to be deposed, as Napoleon had been. Our army, then in France, were to do in America what they had just done in France. That is to say, they were "to deliver the Amer-



"Americans from an oppressive usurpation, and restore them to their former happy connection with a paternal Government." These declarations were, at the period I allude, daily made in the *Times* and the *Courier*. Nay, it is only a few days ago, that the *Times* newspaper, in expressing its regret, that the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands had sent an Ambassador to America, observed, that, if he had stopped for a few months, he might have been spared the disgrace of sending an Ambassador to such people as James Madison and his party.—Let it further be borne in mind, that, soon after the deposing of Napoleon, there having been a debate, in the House of Commons, relative to the reduction of the navy, there was published in the newspapers of the next day, a paragraph, purporting to be the report of a speech of Sir Joseph Yorke, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, in which paragraph it was stated, that, though Napoleon was deposed, we could not yet disarm to any great extent, seeing that there was Mr. Madison yet to depose.—The newspapers have, ever since, held the same language. They have, since the deposition of Napoleon, wholly left out of sight the original ground of the war. Nay, they pretend to have no ground at all. But insist, that, as we now have the opportunity; as we have a fleet afloat, and a disciplined army that we know not what to do with, we ought, while the occasion offers, to re-conquer America, or, at least, to despoil her in such a way, that she shall never again be able to shew her nose upon the sea.—They have published a list of the *American Navy*; and have observed upon it, that, if America be not now cut up; if she be not now, while France, Spain, and Holland are unable to assist her; if she be not now crippled past recovery; if she be now suffered to have peace; if, in short, she be not now destroyed, it is fearful to think of the degree of Naval power, at which she may arrive in the course of ten or a dozen years of uninterrupted prosperity, having had a proof of what her seamen are capable of performing.—That I have here not overcharged, not, in the smallest degree, misrepresented the language of these prints, every reader will allow; and, indeed, I must confess, they spoke, very nearly, the language of the whole nation. How the people of America, from whom nothing can be kept secret, have received this language, I know not; but, if I were to judge of their feel-

ings by what I know to be their character, I should suppose, that it must have filled them with indignation, if, indeed, that feeling did not give way to that of contempt. They must, however, have seen the absolute necessity of union and of exertion, unless they were disposed to become again dependant upon England; unless, in short, they were disposed to become again Royal Provinces, governed by the sons of the nobility of England.—The time, chosen by our prints for the making of those undisguised declarations, was very suspicious. It was the moment when France, Spain, and Holland were put into a state, which rendered it impossible for them to assist America. It was the moment when we were freed from all enemies; when all the maritime force of Europe was in our hands. It was, in short, the first seemingly fair opportunity for subjugating America that had been offered us since the conclusion of the *American war*; and this opportunity the language of these prints must have led the Americans to believe was about to be taken for the purpose of executing the project.—In the year 1794, or 5, a Mr. Rutledge, who was a judge in South Carolina, made a speech, in which he besought his country to join itself with the Republic of France in a mortal war against England. "She will," said he, "never forgive us for our success against her, and for our having established a free Constitution. Let us, therefore, while she is down, seize her by the throat, strangle her, deliver the world of her tyranny, and thus confer on mankind the greatest of blessings." As nearly as I can recollect them, these were his very words. I am sure that I have the ideas correct.—I and many more cried aloud against the barbarity of such sentiments. They were condemned in speeches and pamphlets innumerable.—But, have we not reason to fear, that the present language of our newspapers may make the Americans think that Mr. Rutledge was in the right; and make them regret, that they did not join the Republic of France in the war? If they had taken that step, in the year 1795, the Republic of France might still have been in existence, and the situation of all Europe very different indeed from what it now is. The English party, the love of peace, and the profits of peace, were too powerful in the United States, for those who thought with Mr. Rutledge. Much was said about principles; but, it was the

love of the *profits* of peace which prevailed over every other consideration.—The Americans have now seen enough to convince them, that it would have been their soundest policy to have taken *one side or the other*, long ago.—What they wished for was, *peace and commerce with all the world*; but they have now found, that, to enjoy some peace, they must be prepared to have some war; and that to enjoy independence and freedom, they must make themselves respected in arms.—If the war should end without our doing something, approaching very nearly to the *subjugation* of America, it will prove a most calamitous war to us. Because it will have added immensely to our debt; it will have left us horribly exhausted; it will have given France a time of peace and economy wherein to recover her wonted means of meeting us by land or by sea; it will have made the Americans both a military and a naval nation; it will have given to these two nations the most powerful motives to a close connection, dictated by their mutual wants and safety; it will have rendered America not only completely independent of us as to manufactures, but will have implanted in the bosoms of her people a hatred against us never to be removed or mollified.—If, indeed, we were to subjugate America, to make the States again our colonies; or were, at least, to destroy all her ships of war; raze all her fortifications; stipulate with her never again to make a cannon, a ball, or a pound of powder; to place in our hands, as guarantees, all her principal sea-ports and all the mouths of her rivers; and to abstain from every sort of manufacture in the country. If we were to accomplish either of these, we might have little to apprehend as the consequence of a five or six years war against America. But, if we accomplish neither, how will the case stand? Why, thus: she will, *single handed*, have carried on a war against us. She will have, through the world, the reputation of having been able, alone, to *beat* England; for, to defend herself against us is, in such a case, to *beat* us. Other nations, sore at the sight of our predominance on the sea, will look up to America as to a balance against us. They will naturally seek a connection with a country, offering innumerable sources of beneficial intercourse. She, whose products are so abundant, and so much in request all over the world, and who holds out such great advantages to

every man of enterprise, will have all the world, England excepted, for her friends. No nation will envy or hate her but England; because, to every other nation, the increase of her population, her produce, her commerce, and her naval power must be advantageous.—She may, and she, doubtless, will, *suffer* much in this war. Many of her towns will be knocked down; thousands of her people will be greatly injured. But if she keep on launching ships of war, as she is doing at present, she may have a score of ships of the line and forty frigates, at the end of a six years war, manned with such officers and sailors as those whom we have already seen afloat, and to whom we have had the inexpressible mortification to see so many English ships strike their flags, after contests the most desperate and bloody. If this were to be the effect of this war of *drubbing*, how should we have to curse those malicious writers, who, for so many months, have been labouring to cause this nation to believe, that it will only be a holiday-undertaking to drub, to humble, and to subdue the American nation!—I am aware, that there is a description of men in this country, who say, that, even with all these possible, and even probable, evils before us, we ought to have undertaken, and ought now to proceed with, the war. ‘Because,’ say these men, ‘even if these evils should come *with* the war, they would all, or, at least, the worst of them, come *without* it. Not to have undertaken the war, or to put a stop to it now, would have been, and would now be, to leave the Americans in possession of the naval reputation they have acquired, in possession of all the means of augmenting their naval force, and, what is of still more consequence, in the enjoyment of *real* freedom, and of happiness unparalleled, under a *Republican* Government, at once an example and an asylum to all the *disloyal* of every country in Europe. Leaving her thus, she must, in the present state of men’s minds, prove the destruction of all kingly Government, and of every hierarchy in the world. Therefore, even failure in the war is no objection to persevering in it, seeing that the worst that *can* arise out of the war, *must* arise out of suffering this Republic to enjoy peace, especially with the reputation that she has acquired on that element, the absolute dominion of which we have so long claimed. When there is, at least, a *possibility* of destroy-

ing this Republic by war, and *no possibility* of avoiding destruction from her without war, reason says, *go on with the war!*—I know that there are many that argue thus, because I have heard them argue thus. And, I must confess, that, if I could bring myself to their feelings as to the consequences which they dread, I should be bound to say, that their arguments were unanswerable. As the matter stands, I could, I think, give a satisfactory answer; but, as every one likes to have something left to be supplied by himself, I leave the reader to give to these arguments such an answer, as, after some minutes of sober reflection, his mind may suggest.—Before I conclude, however, I must repeat what I have before said, as to the dilemma in which we are placed. It is very certain, that America, at peace, in the enjoyment of such perfect freedom and such great superiority, under a Republican Government, the very head of which does not receive above five thousand pounds a year, and having no established church, and no use for the hangman; it is certain, that America, presenting this picture to the world, might, and would keep alive the spirit of *Jacobinism* in Europe; and that spirit might, in a few years, produce very serious consequences.—But, on the other hand, to prevent her from presenting this dangerous picture to the world, *we must keep up all our present taxes, and, perhaps, continue to make loans.*—This is the dilemma; the grand dilemma, in which we are at present placed, and out of which, I must confess, I do not see how we are to get, unless we were, as the *Times* supposes we shall, to finish this insolent Republic in the space of “*a few months.*”

NAPLES.—I have for some time intended making a few observations on the wise policy pursued by the present King of Naples, and the great benefits resulting therefrom to his subjects. It will be recollected that Murat, who had been one of the Emperor Napoleon's best generals, enjoyed a more than ordinary share of his confidence, and, as a reward for his merit, was raised to the throne of Naples; was afterwards prevailed upon, by the Allies, to withdraw his support from his former master, and join his troops to those leagued against France. At first sight, this looked like ingratitude. But, when a nearer view was taken of Murat's situation, and

the motives influencing him attentively considered, it appeared to me, at the time, that he acted a prudent part; such a part as fully justified the step he had taken, and cleared him from all censure. The reason he assigned for agreeing to this new alliance was, that he was *obliged* to adopt that measure; that he was threatened with dethronement if he continued any longer in alliance with the Emperor of the French. This, at least, cleared him of all suspicion of having *volunteered* in the cause of the Allies. Murat, however, had not only acquired the art of war, and learned to be a politician; he had been taught the science of Government; and, as it now appears, was fully occupied, at the time of Napoleon's reverses, with plans of improving the state of the country which he governed, of abolishing the ancient tyranny, and of giving good laws to his subjects. He was evidently aware, therefore, if he rejected the flattering offers that were made him to join the coalition, that there was a probability of his being deprived of the opportunity of ameliorating the condition of his people, without benefiting the cause of France. Hence his acquiescence in the proposal to make common cause with the Allies. It was conjectured by some, not without the appearance of probability, that the King of Naples, notwithstanding his joining the enemies of France, was secretly attached to Napoleon. For this I do not see how any one can blame him, if, at the same time, it is acknowledged, that he owed his elevation to the French Emperor. It has been since said, and that only very lately, that Murat was carrying on a treasonable correspondence, through means of his officers, with the Island of Elba. It is easy to account for reports of this nature, when it is seen that Ferdinand, the deposed King, is publicly avowing his determination not to relinquish his claims to the possession of the throne of his ancestors. There are men, in every country, ready, on all occasions, to court the favour of the great by calumniating their supposed enemies; and to such men—the unprincipled flatterers of the former monarch—may easily be traced these base accusations against the present King. Murat, I have no doubt, entertains the highest respect and regard for Napoleon, and may anxiously desire, without committing any crime, to do him a service.—But that he should *openly*, by sending *military* officers to the place of his retro-

ment, seem to invite him again to take the field, and to assert his claims to the crowns of France and Italy, which he had so recently resigned, at the desire of the people, would be to suppose that Murat had, in a moment, lost all sense of prudence, and adopted a line of policy totally different from that by which he formerly gained so much credit, and secured for himself the quiet possession of the throne of Naples. Though these vile traducers of his fame deserved, in my opinion, to be treated with silent contempt, Murat has thought otherwise, as appears from the following declaration, published in the *Neapolitan Moniteur* of the 29th ult.—

Ministry of General Police.—It is not without surprise, that the Government has been informed by letters from Civita-Vecchia and Leghorn, that some individuals, calling themselves officers, employed in the service of his Majesty the King of Naples, and decorated with his Royal Order, have announced themselves as Envoys from the Court of Naples to the Isle of Elba. Although nobody can be deceived as to the object of this miserable stratagem, the undersigned thinks it necessary to declare, that these intriguers do not belong to the kingdom of Naples; that they are unknown to it; and that they have never been charged with any mission to the Isle of Elba. All the Local Authorities are requested to arrest every individual who shall state that he is charged with a similar mission.—This declaration must prove a death blow to all the hopes of the partizans of Ferdinand. Besides, they must know, that the present sovereign's title has been recognised by all the powers of Europe, not even excepting Great Britain, who, nevertheless, are so inconsistent as to refuse acknowledging the titles of the very man who, by force of arms, placed Murat on a throne. The respect paid to a *General* of Napoleon in this case, as well as in the case of the Crown Prince of Sweden, who exercise the sovereign authority by no better title than that by which the French Emperor reigned, ought surely to have procured more attention to the wishes of the latter, when he stipulated—not for the possession of a kingdom to which another had a prior claim, but for the mere acknowledgment of an empty title, that could neither enrich him, add to his consequence, nor injure any of the contracting parties.—But, the most amiable part of Murat's

character remains to be illustrated. I have already said, that, on ascending the throne of Naples, he occupied himself with improving the state of the country, with abolishing the former tyranny, and with giving good laws to his subjects. The external affairs of his kingdom, while the struggle with France existed, must have left him little time to attend to its internal management. Still, it appears, that he possesses a mind, like Napoleon, capable of greater exertions than most other sovereigns; and, as there is every reason to believe he seriously wishes to better the condition of man, we find that, even in the midst of war, he found leisure to carry into effect many of his beneficial schemes. Only six years have elapsed since Murat obtained possession of the throne of Naples. During that short period he has done more substantial good than all the sovereigns of Europe put together have done for the last century. He has awakened a national spirit among the depressed and degraded Neapolitans; he has created a brave and well disciplined army; he has given them wise, political, and judicial institutions; he has conferred on them the means of acquiring education; and, in every part of his Government, measures are uniformly pursued, calculated in an eminent degree, to promote the happiness and prosperity of the nation. The weakness and crimes of former kings, who abandoned themselves to indolence and cupidity, while they left their subjects to be the prey of an interested and barbarous clergy, ultimately drove them from the throne, and, through the instrumentality of Napoleon, prepared the way for the elevation of a man, who appears fully convinced that his best title to the Crown, and its future stability, consists in his making the happiness of his people the chief object of his care. The political causes which led to this important alteration in the condition of the people of Naples, have been very ably discussed in a pamphlet recently published by Ridgway, entitled, "A Letter by an Englishman lately on his Travels in Italy; written on his return to England in Aug. 1814." This pamphlet owes its origin to the protestation of Ferdinand against Murat's right of possession, which the author endeavours to establish, and, I think, pretty successfully. First, upon the right of conquest and cession; secondly, the acknowledgment of the title by all the sovereign powers of Europe; and thirdly, the de-

cession and abdication of the throne by the former monarch. But the most interesting part, is that on which this writer grounds Murat's preferable claim upon his attention to "the happiness and prosperity of the Neapolitan people." Here his title rests upon a basis that, I trust, will never be undermined. It was a similar title that commanded my respect for the Emperor Napoleon; and it is a title without which, in my estimation, every Chief ought to be regarded as a tyrant and usurper, and compelled to relinquish sovereign power. That the reader may judge how far Murat, King of Naples, merits his present elevation, and is entitled to possess the throne he occupies, I have annexed to this article our author's remarks

On the happiness of the Neapolitans, and on the prosperity of the kingdom.

Every acute observer will have remarked, that so much trouble and agitation in Europe has happened, only because certain Governments have too much neglected the principal object of their institution—the public felicity, and the general prosperity. If the happiness of a nation is the truest title of a King; and if that happiness consists in causing a nation to be respected abroad, and in protecting at home the personal safety of all, the liberty, property, and industry of individuals, we find this end entirely accomplished at Naples by the beneficial effects produced by the Government of Joachim, who has inspired a national spirit in a country so long agitated by violent parties, and rendered amiable the royal authority, which had been for a long time so persecuting and odious. From whence we may conclude, that *affection towards a king, is no more than an affection for his Government, and an acknowledgment of his justice.*—Joachim Murat has succeeded in a very few years in forming a navy, as far as is necessary for the defence of the coasts, and for protecting the commerce of the kingdom. He has excited and encouraged industry, manufactures, and commerce, as much as the general state of warfare would permit him. He has formed an army prone to war, and well disciplined, and which has recently given proofs of courage and order, when it was incumbent on it to protect the Ecclesiastical States, and the Grand Duchedom of Tuscany, against the calamities which threatened those countries. The jurisprudence has been reformed; the tribunals administer justice throughout the

provinces with zeal and equity. The taxes are uniformly distributed, and each Neapolitan blesses the order and regularity now established by the Government of Joachim.

Let us now compare this statement, the work of a few years, with the result of the Government of the last dynasty, during the space of seventy years, that it reigned over Naples, and we shall soon perceive the just motives for which the inhabitants of the whole kingdom give so decided a preference to the actual Government.—Charles III. was certainly known to possess a great character for probity, and many other distinguished qualities; but he was wanting in the knowledge necessary for appreciating the resources offered him by the kingdom of Naples, and the genius of its inhabitants: he only conceived the project of a code of laws; he undertook the construction of some public edifices in the capital of his estates, in which he left some traces of magnificence and utility; but every branch of administration, and of political economy, were entirely neglected. Naples possessed neither a civil, nor a criminal code, nor administrative laws. The people of the law, exclusively confined to the knowledge of the laws of the Lombards, of the municipal, of the Roman and canon law, disposed in an arbitrary manner of the fortune and of the liberty of the citizens. To this species of judiciary despotism and legislative chaos, was joined the absolute authority of the King, who, under the name of dispatches, or royal and ministerial decrees, made a capricious interpretation of the laws, destroying the effect and dispositions of them. These dispatches had even the force of laws, there not being any power that could stop, or prevent the execution of them. In Naples, with regard to judiciary or administrative institutions, and the public education, there were no traces, except in the remembrance of what had been done by the Princes of the Houses of Suabia and Aragon. The policy of the last dynasty at Naples, was to annihilate every power that might counterbalance or temper the royal authority. There were no means of opposing the absolute, or despotic power, but by the effect of two institutions. The first consisted of the strength and opinion of the feudal lords over their vassals: the second was in the simulacre of a national representation in the *Sedili* or *Piazze*: a species of corporations chiefly noble, which were permanent in the capital: the de-

stroying of these two institutions, was the same as reducing the inhabitants of the finest country in the world, to the rank of the wretched population of Senegal, or the country of the Caffres. This species of national representation of the *Sedili* or *Piazze* was abolished, and the places in which their sittings were held were demolished: so much did these Princes dread even the traces of the edifices. In order the easier to deceive the Neapolitan nobility, on the motives of this destructive proceeding, the Government ordered all the ancient nobility to be numbered by classes,* feigning that these, or rather the privileged few of the royal anti-chamber, would perfectly replace, in the administration of the city, those ancient bodies of the *Piazze*, who, joined to some members of the commercial community, for several centuries past, had invigilated over the public administration. Moreover, the policy of Government was such as, 1st, To oblige the barons and great proprietors to reside at Naples under its jealous inspection:† in a short time all the provinces were deprived of their greatest landed proprietors, who, alone, had the power of rendering them rich and happy. 2d, To establish no where but in the capital, tribunals, colleges, universities, honours, employments, arts, manufactures, commerce, and even the printing-offices. It was thus that the rest of the kingdom was deprived, through a false and suspicious policy, of every means of civilization, and doomed to ignorance, misery, and servitude. It was thus that the provinces were abandoned, and nine parts in ten of the population reduced to a state almost of savages, whilst that, the other tenth part, was destined to live amidst the intrigues of the Court, and the tumult of the tribunals and courts of justice, consuming their lives and fortunes in the sterile enjoyments of luxury and effeminacy. The Government of Ferdinand sought in vain the means of inspiring a military and national spirit: where there is no example to follow, and where the concatenated order of a good administration exists not, there can be neither army nor country. The Government of Ferdinand was occupied in establishing a powerful navy; but it was

out of all proportion to the revenues of the States, and, above all, with a State that possessed neither commerce, navigation, nor colonies. This great oversight in the Government, produced these disastrous consequences that might be expected.

This was all that was done by the Government of the former dynasty, from the year 1735, in the beautiful kingdom of Naples; while, on the contrary, in the course of a few years, under the new reign of Joachim, Naples possesses a *civil code*, a *penal code*, an *administrative code*, and a *commercial code*. Each province has its own tribunals; people having suits at law are no longer obliged to ruin themselves, by coming to Naples to solicit a judgment. *Feudalism is abolished*, as well as all exclusive privileges; the Neapolitans enjoy a *perfect equality in the face of the law*. The *abuses* of monastic institutions are *destroyed*, the prelates and ministers of the Catholic religion, the only ones protected by the law, enjoy all the consideration that is due to them, with stipends and funds proportioned to their decent maintenance. *Property* is very much divided. A *regular system of finance*, that unfolds every year to the Neapolitan nation the true state of her wants, and her resources, presents at the same time a table of the established taxes, and of the disbursements made with the public revenues. A *national representation assembles every year*, forming the councils of the commons, districts, and provinces; *the deputies are chosen by the people*. These councils statute and deliberate on the objects of interior melioration, whether it be relative to the administration, or to the use made of the public money. They may propose plans of useful establishments, the king having reserved to himself the right of approbation. No law is published, unless approved of by the Council of State.—All the provinces enjoy the benefit of *colleges, lycæums, primary and secondary schools, and charitable establishments*. They have *printing offices and manufactures*; in short, under the new Government, all the inhabitants, from Calabria ultra to the extremity of Abruzzi, have within their reach all the different institutions, *political, judiciary, administrative, and of public education*; and they have the means of making a progress in civilization, without being under the necessity of recurring to the capital.—As to the Neapolitan army, it is *numerous, well-looking, and brave*; it has proved that the southern

* By decree for the creation of a register called the *golden book*.

† A nobleman who made too long a residence on his estate became suspected, as a conspirator, in the eyes of this Government; nor could any gentleman go to his estates without permission.

Italians have rivalled in courage, and the thirst of glory, even the Italians of the north, in the fields of battle, in Spain, in Germany, and in Italy.—This army, which, led by its king, has distinguished itself under his orders, has nothing in common, nor that can be compared with the army of 1798, nor with that of 1806. It has for its chief, and for its model, a great captain, who has made his essays in Africa, as well as in Europe. It has imbibed a national spirit, because the sovereign who commands it is occupied in promoting civilization, and causes the rights of the people to be respected.—I do not here speak merely of the troops of the line, which are equally remarkable for discipline, and for exactness in their manœuvres. I owe the same praises to 70,000 legionaries, or national guards, armed, enregimented, and all chosen from amongst the body of the proprietors of the kingdom. These are the 70,000 legionaries, that, whilst the regular army was employed in Germany and in Spain, have alone defended all the coasts of the kingdom of Naples with as much zeal as bravery; and I might here invoke the testimony of my compatriots, the officers and sailors of the English navy, who are ever ready to do justice to the brave of all nations.—The *navy* is not gigantic, and out of proportion with the state of the revenue as in the time of Ferdinand. It is composed of good officers and sailors, and adapted to its principal destination, which is to defend the coasts, the commerce, and the coasting trade, against the pirates, and Barbary powers.

Such are the various titles of the actual Government to the affection of the people, who in Joachim Murat have placed all their hopes of a perfect civilization, of reform in the administration, and of the public welfare in general.—After this painting of the prosperity of the kingdom of Naples, is it possible to raise a doubt whether it will most promote the happiness of the Neapolitan people, to continue to live under the reign of Joachim, author of so much good, or to retrograde by returning under the Government of Ferdinand Bourbon?

COLONEL QUINTIN.—It appears that this officer is now before a *Court Martial* at Brighton. The reader may, probably, remember, that about two years and a half ago, there was a discussion, in the House of Commons, on a motion of Lord Folkestone, relative to the employment of German

and other foreign officers in our army. During this discussion, it was shewn, that it was *unlawful* to employ such persons in any other corps than in those authorised, by Act of Parliament, during the present war; and this Quintin was particularly named, as a person employed *contrary to law*. The fact was not denied by the Ministers, and those who justified their conduct and the conduct of the military departments; but, it was asserted, and especially by Colonel Palmer, the other Colonel of the regiment (the 10th dragoons), that this Quintin was a person of *most rare and wonderful merit*.—With these facts in my memory, it was not without feelings of great indignation, that I read the other day, in the *Globe* newspaper, a paragraph stating, that in the Court Martial now carrying on against Colonel Quintin, Colonel Palmer acts *officially*, not by *choice*; that the charges have been made *by the junior officers*, and that these charges will *revert upon themselves*, if they should fail in making them good.—It appears to me to be, that this paragraph must have been not only to cause the question to be *prejudged* by the public, but to *intimidate* the prosecutors and the evidences. Let it be observed, that, at the time this paragraph was published, the Court-Martial was actually assembled; the trial was actually going on; and, it is clear as daylight, that the object of this publication must have been to produce a feeling in the public for the accused, and against the accusers.—Now, who would dare to take upon him to say, in print, that Colonel Palmer acted an *unwilling* part in the performance of the office of prosecutor? *who*, I say, would, without some extraordinary cause, dare do this? And thus, not very darkly to give it to be understood, that the Colonel, at least, looked upon the charges as *groundless*?—But, be this as it may, whence comes the assertion, that, if Quintin be *acquitted* the guilt will fall upon the *junior officers*, who, it is said, have accused him? Whence comes this assertion? Whence comes the boldness to broach such a doctrine? If a man be acquitted on a charge of sheep-stealing, or of murder, does the charge, or its consequences, fall upon the accusers? Is the man, who accuses another of forgery, in case of acquittal, hanged in the stead of the accused? We know that this is not so; and, we also know, that, if it were so, NO MAN WOULD EVER BE AC-

CUSED of sheep-stealing, murder, or forgery. This would be the most effectual mode that could possibly be devised for smothering accusations; and, if adopted in the Army, or Navy, it is pretty clear, that we shall never again hear of any misbehaviour of any officer of high rank.—It must be evident to every one, that the *inferior* officers have much against them in the making of accusations against their superiors; that they must feel the many disadvantages under which they labour; that it never can be a *trifling* matter to put them in motion against their Commanding Officer, who has so many means of annoying the first to complain of his conduct.—Therefore, when complaints are preferred by junior officers against their Commanders, they ought, it seems to me, to be heard with attention; and *support* ought to be tendered them; and not threats held forth to *intimidate* them.—I know nothing of the nature of the charges against this foreigner; I have never heard them stated; I have never heard any particulars relative to the conduct or the character of the man; but, I know well, that it is, during the sitting of a Court of any sort, upon any case, monstrously indecent and unjust, to publish *threats*, calculated to *intimidate* *prosecutors* or *witnesses*; and, that such is the tendency of the paragraph above-mentioned, no man in his senses can doubt.

CORN BILL.—Since my last, I have the mortification to hear, that the importation of *cattle* from France is *stopped altogether*; and that butter, eggs, &c. are to pay a heavy duty.—I have no doubt, that the *Corn Bill* is to be tried again; and, therefore, I shall, in the course of two or three Numbers, make all the efforts I am able to prevent the adoption of so mischievous a measure; a measure which would deprive us of the only advantage promised us in peace; namely, an intercourse with a nation which has freed itself from its ancient trammels.

AMERICA.

MR. COBBETT.—Since the close of the grand drama, entitled "a war against Bonaparte," we have had a little more leisure to attend to the lesser drama, entitled "the American War," which is now performing for the *amusement* and satisfaction of John Bull.—While the former, with all its accompaniments was going on,

in a manner, close at our doors, the latter was deemed too distant, and too insignificant for "the most thinking people in the world," to think any thing at all about it.—Now, however, the case is different.—As we have got Boney, like Prometheus, fairly chained to his rock; with, I suppose, the accompaniment of his vulture too, in the shape of remorse, or rather of regret, we have leisure to look about us, and to consider this *nice little bit of a war* in all its bearings.—John Bull has bawled himself hoarse, hurraing for the peace.—He has burnt oceans of oil, and tons of tallow, besides abundance of royal rockets, and squibs, and crackers, in celebrating the *glorious peace*! And after all the noise and fuss is over, he stands with a stupid stare of amazement, wondering how the deuce this peace feels so very unlike what he expected.—He feels almost as incredulous about it, as Lord Peter's brothers did, when he wanted "to palm his dam'd crusts upon them, as mutton!" He holds a dialogue with himself, something like the following,—“So, we have got peace, have we?—Aye, so they tell me; but somehow or other it does not feel of the right sort.—But what say the Funds? rising, eh? Sinking, sinking.—What says Omnium? Below par.—Property Tax taken off? Not a sou.—Other taxes lowered? No, not one.—Ships paid off; troops disbanded? No such thing.—Humph! this *may be* peace; but, odso, it feels, somehow or other, devilish like war.”—Aye, honest John Bull; and devilish like war thou wilt find it, let me tell thee. The sapient and *humane* editor of "the *Times*" talks of "*crushing* the Americans at once," just as a giant would crush a blind puppy! But good Mr. Times, that is easier said than done. As far as vulgar Billingsgate abuse can go, you, and your brother of the *Courier*, have done your best to irritate and inflame the Americans. But, we might as well expect pure water from a jakes, as decent language or liberal sentiments from two such corrupt sources.—In the Minister's speeches, delivered through the Regent, we have been repeatedly told of the *unprovoked* aggression on the part of the Americans! If he had condescended to mention the instances of aggression, it would have been more satisfactory; for I, for one, must be pardoned, for not believing even his *royal* word upon such an occasion. So far from having been the aggressors, they bore with our

insolent Orders in Council, much longer than we would have borne any thing similar on their parts; and all they now ask is, that we shall not stop their ships, and take what of their crews we think proper, without proving them to be British subjects! This is, on their part, the *sole* cause of the war! Give up this, and they will make peace to-morrow.—But, softly; that would not suit our *worthy* Ministers. War is their harvest, and taxes and loans are their crops. Now, no man likes to reap a scanty crop, when he may have a full one. They have of late been accustomed to the sweets of handling upwards of ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY MILLIONS A YEAR, with all the power and patronage consequent upon such an enormous sum; and, I am afraid, it would require even more virtue than they are possessed of, to conclude a peace which would deprive them of one half of their power, besides disobliging a vast number of *worthy* people, who, at present, are in the best humour possible, but who would grumble sadly, if their sop was taken from them.—The American War is an *entertainment* of that kind, that they can and will spin out just as long—as John Bull has any money to pay for it.—They may burn some sea-port towns, and do a deal of mischief to individuals, but, as to making any serious impression on America, I question if even the learned Secretary to the Admiralty believes it to be possible. We tried it once before, when all our means were fresh and vigorous; when the American population was not *one third* of what it is now; when their Government was weak and without credit; and when we had many partisans in their country.—How our attempt ended, is well known; and how any similar attempt would *now* end, may be very easily conjectured.—Among all the other evils our infatuated Ministry are bringing upon their devoted country, they are forcing America to become a great naval power; and although our present *able* and *active* Admiralty may ridicule the idea, yet the oldest of them may live to see cause to think very differently upon the subject. Our merchants now begin to take the alarm; these impudent dogs of Yankees are taking their ships at their very doors. They deserve to suffer; richly deserve it. The bulk of them have all along been zealous Government men of the true Pitt breed; strenuous supporters of the war, so long as they could make a farthing by it; and all most

anxious for *humbling* the Yankees; but now that they are getting some raps over the knuckles from these same Yankees, they make a most terrible song about it.—Instead of petitioning the Regent to read a lecture to his friend Croker, about conveying their sugar and tobacco, they would have acted more justly and more wisely had they petitioned him at once to put an end to an unjust and unnecessary war, instead of singing out about their paltry individual losses, which, compared to those of the nation, are as a drop in the ocean.—Talleyrand, in the *Exposé* of his budget, says, that every individual in this country pays *five* times as much in taxes, as every individual in France pays. Their debt is trifling; while ours is creeping up almost beyond the power of figure to count. The prospect is sufficiently appalling; but, I repeat it, the *fingering* of the immense sums which the Ministry have of late been accustomed to, is too precious a privilege to be abandoned without compulsion. Let them then be compelled to abandon it; let the voice of the people be heard, in a way not to be misunderstood; let petitions and remonstrances from all quarters be poured in, demanding that an end be put to an odious and unjust war; and let them not be misled by a cry about our maritime *rights*, but calmly ascertain whether these rights are not *wrongs*. In short, in judging of these, let them apply the universal golden rule of “doing as they would be done by.”—I remain, Sir, your’s, &c. G. K.

Strathmore, Sept. 19, 1814.

ATTACK ON FORT ERIE—BATTLE OF CHIPAWA—DEVASTATION AT WASHINGTON.—I have inserted below the most material parts of the *official* documents respecting these important occurrences, upon which I will make some remarks in my next. At present I shall only observe, that notwithstanding all our *boasting* about the taking of Washington, we have not been the *gainers* by the event whatever the Americans have lost. Our troops, in fact, were obliged immediately to *decamp*. They could not remain a single day:—and thus must they do every where they land. Only think of the *expence* of such a war! We *conquer* nothing; we *capture* nothing; and almost every action is followed by a *retreat*:—GENERAL BROWN’S REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF THE 25th UCT. AT THE FALLS OF NIAGARA. SIR,—Confined as I was, and have been,

since the last engagement with the enemy, I fear that the account I am about to give may be less full and satisfactory than under other circumstances it might have been made. I particularly fear that the conduct of the gallant men it was my good fortune to lead, will not be noticed in a way due to their fame and the honour of our country.

You are already apprized, that the army had on the 25th ult. taken a position at Chippawa. About noon of that day, Colonel Swift, who was posted at Lewistown, advised me by express, that the enemy appeared in considerable force in Queenstown, and on its heights; that four of the enemy's fleet had arrived during the preceding night, and were then lying near Fort Niagara; and that a number of boats were in view, moving up the streight. Within a few minutes after this intelligence had been received, I was further informed by Capt. Denmon, of the Quarter-master's-department, that the enemy were landing at Lewistown, and that our baggage and stores at Schlosser, and on their way thither, were in danger of immediate capture.

It is proper here to mention, that having received advices as late as the 20th, from General Gaines, that our fleet was then in port, and the Commodore sick, we ceased to look for co-operation from that quarter, and determined to disencumber ourselves of baggage, and march directly to Burlington Heights. To mask this intention, and to draw from Schlosser a small supply of provisions, I fell back upon Chippawa. As this arrangement, under the increased force of the enemy, left much at hazard on our own side of the Niagara, and as it appeared by the before stated information, that the enemy was about to avail himself of it, I conceived that the most effectual method of recalling him from this object was to put myself in motion towards Queenstown. General Scott, with the 1st brigade, Towson's artillery, and all the dragoons and mounted men, were accordingly put in march on the road leading thither, with orders to report if the enemy appeared, and to call for assistance, if that was necessary.

On the General's arrival at the Falls, he learned that the enemy was in force directly in his front—a narrow piece of woods alone intercepting his view of them. Waiting only to give this information, he advanced upon them. By the time Assistant Adjutant-General Jones had delivered his message, the action began, and before the remaining part of the division had crossed the Chippawa, it had become close and general between the advanced corps. Though General Ripley, with the 2d brigade, Major Hindman, with the corps of artillery, and General Porter, at the head of his command, had respectively pressed forward with ardour, it was not less than an hour before they were brought to sustain General Scott, during which time his command most skilfully and gallantly

maintained the conflict. Upon my arrival I found that the General had passed the wood, and engaged the enemy on the Queenstown road, and on the ground to the left of it, with the 9th, 11th, and 22d regiments, and Towson's artillery.

The 25th had been thrown to the right, to be governed by circumstances. Apprehending that these corps were much exhausted, and knowing that they had suffered severely, I determined to interpose a new line with the advancing troops, and thus disengage Gen. Scott, and hold his brigade in reserve. Orders were accordingly given to Gen. Ripley. The enemy's artillery at this moment occupied a hill which gave him great advantages, and was the key of the whole position. It was supported by a line of infantry. To secure the victory, it was necessary to carry this artillery, and seize the height. This duty was assigned to Colonel Miller, while, to favour its execution, the 1st regiment, under the command of Colonel Nicholas, was directed to menace and amuse the infantry. To my great mortification, this regiment, after a discharge or two, gave way, and retreated some distance before it could be rallied, though it is believed the officers of the regiment exerted themselves to shorten this distance.

In the mean-time, Colonel Miller, without regard to this occurrence, advanced steadily and gallantly to his object, and carried the height and the cannon. General Ripley brought up the 23d (which had also faltered) to his support, and the enemy disappeared from before them. The 1st regiment was now brought into a line on the left of the 21st, and the detachments of the 17th and 19th, General Porter occupying, with his command, the extreme left. About this time Colonel Miller carried the enemy's cannon.

The 25th regiment, under Major Jessup, was engaged in a more obstinate conflict with all that remained to dispute with us the field of battle. The Major, as has been already stated, had been ordered by General Scott, at the commencement of the action, to take ground to his right. He had succeeded in turning the enemy's left flank—had captured (by a detachment, under Captain Ketchum) General Riall, and sundry other officers, and shewed himself again to his own army in a blaze of fire, which defeated or destroyed a very superior force of the enemy. He was ordered to form on the right of the 2d regiment. The enemy rallying his forces, and, as is believed, having received reinforcements, now attempted to drive us from our position, and regain his artillery. Our line was unshaken, and the enemy repulsed. Two other attempts, having the same object, had the same issue. General Scott was again engaged in repelling the former of these, and the last I saw of him on the field of battle, he was near the head of his column, and giving to its march a direction that would have placed him on the enemy's right. It

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was with great pleasure I saw the good order and intrepidity of General Porter's Volunteers from the moment of their arrival, but during the last charge of the enemy those qualities were conspicuous.

Stimulated by the examples set them by their gallant leader, by Major Wood of the Pennsylvania corps, by Col. Dobbin, of New York, and by their officers generally, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy's line, and made all the prisoners which were taken at this point of the action.

Having been for some time wounded, and being a good deal exhausted by loss of blood, it became my wish to devolve the command on General Scott, and retire from the field; but, on inquiry, I had the misfortune to learn that he was disabled by wounds; I therefore kept my post, and had the satisfaction to see the enemy's last effort repulsed. I now consigned the command to General Ripley.

While retiring from the field, I saw and felt that the victory was complete on our part, if proper measures were promptly adopted to secure it. The exhaustion of the men was, however, such as made some refreshment necessary. They particularly required water. I was myself extremely sensible of the want of this necessary article. I therefore believed it proper that Gen. Ripley and the troops should return to camp, after bringing off the dead, the wounded, and the artillery; and in this I saw no difficulty, as the enemy had entirely ceased to act. Within an hour after my arrival in camp, I was informed that General Ripley had returned without annoyance, and in good order. I now sent for him, and after giving him my reasons for the measure I was about to adopt, ordered him to put the troops into the best possible condition; to give them the necessary refreshment; to take with him the picquets and camp-guards, and every other description of force, to put himself on the field of battle as the day dawned, and there to meet and beat the enemy if he again appeared. To this order he made no objection, and I relied upon its execution. It was not executed. I feel most sensibly how inadequate are my powers in speaking of the troops, to do justice either to their merits or to my own sense of them. Under abler directions, they might have done more and better.

I enclose a return of our loss; those noted as missing, may generally be numbered with the dead. The enemy had had little opportunity of making prisoners.

I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.

(Signed) JACOB BROWN.

Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary at War.

Copy of a Letter from Brigadier-General Gaines to the Secretary at War, dated

Head-quarters Fort Erie, U. C.
Aug. 15, 7 a.m.

DEAR SIR—My heart is gladdened with gratitude to Heaven and joy to my country,

to have it in my power to inform you that the gallant army under my command has this morning beaten the enemy, commanded by Lieutenant-General Drummond, after a severe conflict of near three hours, commencing at two o'clock, a. m. They attacked us on each flank, got possession of the salient bastion of the old Fort Erie, which was regained at the point of the bayonet, with a dreadful slaughter. The enemy's loss in killed and prisoners is about 600—near 300 killed.—Our loss is considerable, but I think not one-tenth as great as that of the enemy. I will not detain the express to give you the particulars. I am preparing my force to follow up the blow.—With great respect and esteem your obedient servant,

EDMUND P. GAINES,

Brigadier-General Commanding.

Hon. J. Armstrong, Secretary at War.

Downing-street, Sept. 27, 1814.

Captain Smith, Assistant Adjutant-General to the troops under Major-General Ross, arrived this morning with a dispatch from that Officer, addressed to Earl Bathurst, one of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, of which the following is a copy:—

Tonnant, in the Patuxent, Aug. 30, 1814.

MY LORD—I have the honour to communicate to your Lordship, that on the night of the 24th inst. after defeating the army of the United States on that day, the troops under my command entered and took possession of the city of Washington.

It was determined between Sir A. Cochrane and myself, to disembark the army at the village of Benedict, on the right bank of the Patuxent, with the intention of co-operating with Rear-Admiral Cockburn, in an attack upon a flotilla of the enemy's gun-boats, under the command of Commodore Barney. On the 20th instant, the army commenced its march, having landed the previous day without opposition: on the 21st it reached Nottingham, and on the 22d moved on to Upper Marlborough, a few miles distant from Pig Point, on the Patuxent, where Admiral Cockburn fell in with and defeated the flotilla, taking and destroying the whole. Having advanced to within sixteen miles of Washington, and ascertaining the force of the enemy to be such as might authorise an attempt at carrying his capital, I determined to make it, and accordingly put the troops in movement on the evening of the 23d. A corps of about 1,200 men appeared to oppose us, but retired after firing a few shots. On the 24th, the troops resumed their march, and reached Bladensburg, a village situated on the left bank of the eastern branch of the Potowmack about five miles from Washington.

On the opposite side of that river the enemy was discovered strongly posted on very commanding heights, formed in two lines, his advance occupying a fortified house, which, with artillery, covered the bridge

over the eastern branch, across which the British troops had to pass. A broad and straight road leading from the bridge to Washington, ran through the enemy's position, which was carefully defended by artillery and riflemen.

The disposition for the attack being made, it was commenced with so much impetuosity by the light brigade, consisting of the 85th light infantry and the light infantry companies of the army, under the command of Colonel Thornton, that the fortified house was shortly carried, the enemy retiring to the higher grounds.

In support of the light brigade I ordered up a brigade under the command of Colonel Brooke, who, with the 44th regiment, attacked the enemy's left, the 4th regiment pressing his right with such effect as to cause him to abandon his guns. His first line giving way, was driven on the second, which yielding to the irresistible attack of the bayonet, and the well-directed discharge of rockets, got into confusion and fled, leaving the British masters of the field. The rapid flight of the enemy, and his knowledge of the country, precluded the possibility of many prisoners being taken, more particularly as the troops had, during the day, undergone considerable fatigue.

The enemy's army, amounting to eight or nine thousand men, with three or four hundred cavalry, was under the command of General Winder, being formed of troops drawn from Baltimore and Pennsylvania.—His artillery, ten pieces of which fell into our hands, was commanded by Commodore Barney, who was wounded and taken prisoner. The artillery I directed to be destroyed.

Having halted the army for a short time, I determined to march upon Washington, and reached that city at eight o'clock that night. Judging it of consequence to complete the destruction of the public buildings with the least possible delay, so that the army might retire without loss of time, the following buildings were set fire to and consumed—the Capitol, including the Senate-house and House of Representatives, the Arsenal, the Dock-yard, Treasury, War-office, President's Palace, Rope-walk, and the great bridge across the Potomack: in the Dock-yard a frigate, nearly ready to be launched, and a sloop of war, were consumed. The two bridges leading to Washington over the eastern branch had been destroyed by the enemy, who apprehended an attack from that quarter. The object of the expedition being accomplished, I determined, before any greater force of the enemy could be assembled, to withdraw the troops, and accordingly commenced retiring on the night of the 25th. On the evening of the 29th we reached Benedict, and re-embarked the following day. In the performance of the operation I have detailed, it is with the utmost satisfaction I observe to your Lordship, that cheerfulness in undergoing fatigue, and

anxiety for the accomplishment of the object, were conspicuous in all ranks.

To Sir Alexander Cochrane my thanks are due, for his ready compliance with every wish connected with the welfare of the troops, and the success of the expedition.

To Rear Admiral Cockburn, who suggested the attack upon Washington, and who accompanied the army, I confess the greatest obligation for his cordial co-operation and advice.

[Here the General enters into an eulogium on the good conduct of the officers of the army and navy, and concludes thus.]

An attack upon an enemy so strongly posted could not be effected without loss. I have to lament that the wounds received by Colonel Thornton, and the other officers and soldiers left at Bladensburg, were such as prevented their removal. As many of the wounded as could be brought off were removed, the others being left with medical care and attendants. The arrangements made by Staff Surgeon Baxter for their accommodation have been as satisfactory as circumstances would admit of. The agent for British prisoners of war, very fortunately residing at Bladensburg, I have recommended the wounded officers and men to his particular attention, and trust to his being able to effect their exchange when sufficiently recovered.

Captain Smith, Assistant-Adjutant-General of the troops, who will have the honour to deliver this dispatch, I beg leave to recommend to your Lordship's protection, as an officer of much merit, and great promise, and capable of affording any further information that may be requisite.

Sanguine in hoping for the approbation of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, and of his Majesty's Government, as to the conduct of the troops under my command,

I have, &c.

(Signed) Gen. Ross. Major-Gen.

Total Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing, of the Troops under the command of Major-General Ross, in action with the Enemy, on the 24th August, 1814, on the Heights above Bladensburg.

1 Captain, 2 Lieutenants, 5 serjeants, 55 rank and file, 10 horses, killed; 2 Lieutenant-Colonels, 1 Major, 1 Captain, 14 Lieutenants, 2 Ensigns, 10 serjeants, 155 rank and file, 8 horses, wounded.

Admiralty-Office, Sept. 27, 1814.

Captain Wainwright, of his Majesty's ship Tonnant, arrived this morning at this Office, with dispatches from Vice Admiral the Hon. Sir Alexander Cochrane, K. B. to John Wilson Croker, Esq. of which the following are copies:—

Tonnant, in the Patuxent, Sept. 2, 1814.

SIR—I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of the proceedings of his Majesty's combined sea and land forces since my arrival with the fleet within

the Capes of Virginia; and I beg leave to offer my congratulations to their Lordships upon the successful termination of an expedition, in which the whole of the enemy's flotilla, under Commodore Barney, has been captured or destroyed; his army, though greatly superior in number, and strongly posted with cannon, defeated at Bladensburg—the city of Washington taken—the capital, with all the public buildings, military arsenals, dock-yard, and the rest of their naval establishment, together with a vast quantity of naval and military stores, a frigate of the largest class ready to launch, and a sloop of war afloat, either blown up or reduced to ashes.

Such a series of successes in the centre of an enemy's country, surrounded by a numerous population, could not be acquired without loss, and we have to lament the fall of some valuable officers and men; but considering the difficulties the forces had to contend with, the extreme heat of the climate, and their coming into action at the end of a long march, our casualties are astonishingly few.

My letter of the 11th of August will have acquainted their Lordships of my waiting in the Chesapeake, for the arrival of Rear-Admiral Malcolm, with the expedition from Bermuda.

The Rear-Admiral joined me on the 17th, and as I had gained information from Rear-Admiral Cockburn, whom I found, in the Potomack, that Commodore Barney, with the Baltimore flotilla, had taken shelter at the head of the Patuxent, this afforded a pretext for ascending that river to attack him near its source, above Pig Point, while the ultimate destination of the combined force was Washington, should it be found that the attempt might be made with any prospect of success. To give their Lordships a more correct idea of the place of attack, I send a sketch of the country upon which the movements of the army and navy are portrayed; by it their Lordships will observe, that the best approach to Washington is by Port Tobacco, upon the Potomack, and Benedict, upon the Patuxent, from both of which are direct and good roads to that city, and their distances nearly alike; the roads from Benedict divide about five miles inland; the one by Piscataway and Bladensburg, the other following the course of the river, although at some distance from it, owing to the creeks that run up the country; this last passes through the towns of Nottingham and Marlborough to Bladensburg, at which town the river called the Eastern Branch, that bounds Washington to the eastward, is fordable, and the distance is about five miles. There are two bridges over this river at the city; but it was not to be expected that the enemy would leave them accessible to an invading army.

Previously to my entering the Patuxent, I detached Captain Gordon, of his Majesty's ship Seahorse, with that ship, and the ships

and bombs named in the margin, up the Potomack, to bombard Fort Washington (which is situated on the left bank of that river, (about ten or twelve miles below the city,) with a view of destroying the fort, and opening a free communication above, as well as to cover the retreat of the army, should its return by the Baden-burg road be found too hazardous from the accession of strength the enemy might obtain from Baltimore; it was also reasonable to expect, that the militia from the country to the northward and westward would flock in, so soon as it should be known that their capital was threatened.

Captain Sir Peter Parker, in the *Menelaus*, with some small vessels, was sent up the Chesapeake above Baltimore, to divert the attention of the enemy in that quarter, and I proceeded with the remainder of the naval force and the troops, up this river, and landed the army, upon the 19th and 20th, at Benedict.

So soon as the necessary provisions and stores could be assembled and arranged, Major-General Ross, with his army, moved towards Nottingham, while our flotilla, consisting of the armed launches, pinnaces, barges, and other boats of the fleet, under the command of Rear-Admiral Cockburn, passed up the river, being instructed to keep upon the right flank of the army, for the double purpose of supplying it with provisions, and, if necessary, to pass it over to the left bank of the river, into Calvert County, which secured a safe retreat to the ships, should it be judged necessary.

The army reached Nottingham upon the 21st, and on the following day arrived at Marlborough; the flotilla continued advancing towards the station of Commodore Barney, about three miles above Pig Point, who, although much superior in force to that sent against him, did not wait an attack, but at the appearance of our boats set fire to his flotilla, and the whole of his vessels, excepting one, were blown up.

(Signed) ALEXANDER COCHRANE.

Vice-Adm. and Commander-in-Chief.

John Wilson Croker, Esq.

* *Eurylus*, *Devastation*, *Alena*, *Meteor*, *Manly*, and *Erebus*.

NATIONAL DEBT.

MR. COBBETT,——I had last week put together a few thoughts respecting the relative situations of France and England, and intended to have requested of you a place for them in your Register; but, on reading your Summary of Politics of the 17th inst. I find you have anticipated my idea, and have done it in so masterly a manner, that, I think, its publication ought not to be confined to the Register alone, but that it would be a public benefit if you were to have that Summary printed by itself, and sold at a very low price throughout the three kingdoms. It

ought not to be confined merely to the reading of those who can afford to take your Register, but should be diffused, and strongly inculcated upon the minds of all who are possessed of the powers of reflection. It has too long been the fashion, to leave what is called the *poor* out of the question; to deem that opinion of no weight, and their wants amply provided for by the *Poor House*. It is now time to alter our opinion; to consider them as our fellow-creatures; and, instead of shifting them off, as we now do, to the *parish*, it is our duty to enquire how so many millions of our fellow-creatures, equally gifted by nature with ourselves, and to whom a character of former industry to procure their admittance into the *Workhouse* is necessary; how they have become *poor*, while those, who grumbling at the payment of the miserable pittance we allow for their maintenance in those receptacles of distress, are become *rich*? It may be necessary also to take into our consideration the respective numbers of each, and thence to draw a conclusion.—If the operation of a certain cause, or a certain number of causes, has produced the effect of impoverishing a given number of industrious inhabitants, and of enriching a given number of other inhabitants, not more industrious, but more fortunate; if the number of the latter bears no proportion to the number of the former; although the intrinsic quantum of poverty and riches may nearly counterbalance each other; so that, strictly speaking, the state may not have lost thereby, property having only shifted hands; yet, taking into our consideration that society owes its existence to mutual, not partial advantage, and that Government is for the good of all; we shall find ourselves under the necessity of pronouncing that state of society to be bad which allows, and that system to be defective which operates to the advantage of the few, and the ruin of the many. Neither can we be so blind as not to see, that a society, formed on principles which throw all power and all means into one scale, cannot, and, the philanthropist will add, ought not to be of long duration. But, Sir, when we have found, that these evils arise from the wanton and profuse expenditure of the public money, collected under the denomination of taxes; and proceeding further in our investigation as to the manner in which those taxes are imposed;

what they are intended to perform; in what manner they are employed; it may, perhaps, strike some people, that it had been better for the English nation, in particular, and for mankind at large, had such *civilization* never taken place in England, or had its Government never been invested with the power of raising a single shilling on land; the foundation of those taxes, the source of wealth to a few, and of misery to thousands. The Loans, however, once contracted, and security given for their payment, it will be more than ridiculous; it would be inhuman; to continue seeking the payment of the taxes at the hands of those who have already reached the *Workhouse*, or are posting thither. France now sets us an example, and *fas est et ab horte doceri*, by selling a part of the *Crown Domains*, to pay off the National Debt. Why then should not Britain follow the example? Why are not some of the *Crown Lands* applied to extinguish a part of our debt? Why is not a part of the lands of individuals to undergo the same fate? *They are already pledged to the very Loan*; they have again been repledged by the lives and fortune men to the Crown, to carry on the war, and no one, most certainly, will dispute the validity of either pledge; the first by deliberate Acts of the United Legislature, and the other by voluntary declarations on the part of the landed and funded gentry. But towards that portion of the public *possessed of nothing*, except their labour and their industry, such offers, such gifts, can certainly have no relation.—Land and property are represented; they may be legally given. Labour sends no Member to Parliament. Ought Parliament then to call upon the labour of the people? Landholders and Stockholders offer their lives and fortunes to wage war, whence the poor derive only additional misery. Let the lives and the fortunes, so offered, be the price of their fondness for bloodshed; but the simple peasant, the industrious mechanic, ought not to be the sacrifice. The rich called for war, let the rich pay the taxes; or, rather, let their *superfluities* be offered upon the altar of the country, to pay off the National Debt! My paper, however, reminds me that it is time to finish this Letter: perhaps on a future occasion the subject may be resumed.

ARISTIDES.

Sept. 22, 1814.